International Cooperative Business Models by Jirasek, J.
International Cooperative Business 
Models
Jirasek, J.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-90-063
October 1990 
Jirasek, J. (1990) International Cooperative Business Models. IIASA Working Paper. WP-90-063 Copyright © 1990 by the 
author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3392/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
Working Paper 
International Cooperative Business 
Models 
Jaroslav Jirbsek 
WP-90-63 
October 1990 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria 
Telephone: (0 22 36) 715 21 * 0  Telex: 079 137 iiasa a D Telefax: (0  22 36) 71313 
International Cooperative Business 
Models 
Jaroslav Jzra'sek 
WP-90-63 
October 1990 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed 
herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member 
Organizations. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis A-2361 Laxenburg Austria 
Telephone: (0 22 36) 715 2 1  * 0  O Telex: 079  137 iiasa a Telefax: (0  22 36) 71313 
Contents 
1 Towards A New Political and Economic Setting in Europe 1 
2 General Growth of Complexity, Complementarity 
and Synergy 
3 Cooperative Business Strategies 3 
4 The Dynamism of International Cooperative Course in Business 4 
5 Structural Conclusions 7 
6 Rationales for Business Collaborations/ "Critical Mass" 7 
7 Taxonomy of Frequent Business Collaborations 8 
7.1 Cooperative Sub-contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
7.2 Cooperative Business in Clusters and Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
7.3 New Firms Founding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
7.4 Cooperation on Joint Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
7.5 Interfirm Research and Technology Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
8 High Technology's Impact on Cooperative Behavior 12 
9 Global Dimensions for Cooperative Business 12 
10 Comments on the volatile character of collaborative relations 13 
11 What Does Cooperative Business Behavior Mean For Eastern Europe 13 
12 East-West Cooperative Options 14 
Models 
International Cooperative Business 
Jaroslav Jirasek 
1 Towards A New Political and Economic Setting in Europe 
Major developments of East- West relations are subject to  global, political, economic and socie  
cultural driving forces. They are part of the general scenery, fluxes and constant opportunities 
and constraints that shape the present world realities. 
After a thaw in international affairs, cooperative economic and business activities increased 
in the 1970s. However, in 1979 interest rates began to  rise in international markets thereby 
heavily loading the accumulated Eastern debts. Thereafter another Western recession took 
place and Western imports plummeted. Also the international lending funds and commercial 
credits were curtailed. East European countries had to  adjust to the economic imbalance and 
restrict their imports. 
Already in 1982, compared with 1979, the decline of foreign relations between East and West 
was reduced to  some 80%. This tendency was continued until the end of 1980s. While political 
horizons were gaining brightness, economic constraints raised a kind of reluctance in mutual 
production and trade arrangements. The total eastern debt arrived to  some US $100 billion. 
The East European economy has stagnated since the late 1970s on both the domestic as 
well as on the international scale (see Table 1). Longtime political criticism merged with faint 
economic performance. Juxtaposition of West and East economies exhibited an irreversibly 
widening gap. 
Table 1: Economic and Trade Growth (in %/year) 1980-1986 
GNP Trade 
Export Import 
OECD Countries 2.4 3.0 4.1 
East European Six 1.4 4.1 1 .O 
Source: UN Economic Bulletin for Europe, ECE, 
Geneva, November 1987 
In 1989 a swift sequence of political upheavals in East European countries accelerated the 
collapse of rigid political structures that overlived their postwar rationales. Declination of the 
role of political, military and economic rival institutions, make a much broader path for cooper- 
ative relations. Prerequisites are growing for an all-European economic advancement. A unique 
international setting will come into being, making it possible to extend the "active zone" of 
economic progress to  the other side of Europe. 
2 General Growth of Complexity, Complementarity 
and Synergy 
The business and economic activities constitute an autonomous sphere in the society, however 
they do not develop independently from major societal changes ("megatrends"). The scientific 
image of the world has undergone principal shifts in the last decades which supply some valuable 
arguments for the explanation of the growing importance of synergetic formations. 
The structural changes of the past fifteen to twenty years were associated with avowed shifts 
in proportions of strategic variables of the economic growth. Among them were identified: 
r the service sector's share in the volume of the economy has been extended beyond one half 
and exceeded the agricultural and industrial sectors put together; 
r new strategic factors came into existence, in particular the human, social and political 
(democratic) factor, the environmental factor and lately the international factors of eco- 
nomic changes; 
r the traditional overtake of raw materials and energy, has been interchanged by an overtake 
of knowledge and variable "humann capital; 
r the economy of scale has been put into a competitive stance with the economy of scope; 
r former limits to  "economic distancen were broken by the enhancement of transport, com- 
munication and informatics.' 
Science (natural and social) has divulged new findings in the sense that the beliefs of "one 
best way," which constituted an obligatory approach to  microeconomics, is loosing its lead. 
Instead, as a result of the contemporary scientific technological revolution, political and economic 
upheavals, many - more or less equivalent - paths to the future may be pursued. 
It was another scientific discovery that  a general tendency was coming of age: a principle of 
complementarity and synergy. A deeper knowledge of natural laws and social trends renders it 
possible to develop a modular concept of production and look for effective interfaces between 
autonomous modules. 
Theoretical studies of collaborative schemes based on structural and functional complemen- 
tarity and synergetic effects constitute several goal-oriented options: 
r evolutionist improvement of the input-output ratio through input sharing and/or output 
composition; 
r attainment of a threshold mass for a start-up, or of a scale/scope advantage; 
r development of new structures/functions with significant desired properties; 
r protection of resources; 
r environment conditioning; 
safeguarding and self defense; 
risk pooling; 
r reproductive g r ~ w t h . ~  
All those general findings derive mostly from evolutionary biology and sociology, which also 
apply to  capital, business, and economy. The relation of competing values can be substituted 
as asset-liabilities, benefit-cost and goods-money, etc. 
Synergetic schemes are particularly relevant to  models of collective values, shared by homo- 
geneous partners. In such models, business/economic values figure along with human, social, 
and ecological values. However, their proportion and mechanism of teleological selection are still 
obscured. 
'see also De Bandt, J.:  Cooperative Behavior among Economic Agents within the Production System, in: 
Struempel, B.(ed.): Industrial Societies after the Stagnation of the 1970s, Berlin - New York, de Gruyter 1989. 
'see generalizations in Coming, P.A.: The Synergism Hypothesis, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1983, pp. 78-86. 
Mathematical models disclosed that  axiomatic rules cannot be taken for granted in many 
non-standard options. 
A general synergy rule has been suggested by H. Von Foerster in the 1960s. It is built up on 
the "superadditive composition": 
f ( z ,  Y) + f ( z ) f ( y ) ,  
where z ,  y are the cooperating agents. Later, that formula was extended: 
where c substitutes the "cost" of a s s ~ c i a t i o n . ~  
The rule hardly supercedes the formula that "the whole is more than the sum ot if parts." 
The latter rule is to  be interpreted not as an additive operation, but as an emergence of new 
properties capable to  exist only as composites. 
Collaborative actions may get out of control and convert into a kind of deviation. Sometimes 
the pursuit of mutual goals looses is its synergetic effect and the process continues as joint, 
but from the point of synergy neutral. Or synergy may turn over into dysynergy ("negative 
synergyn), devastating i m p a c k 4  
R. Thom studied cases of nonliner transformations leading into "combinatorial catastro- 
phes". He was able to identify mathematical patterns of such developments, but not clarify the 
rationales of unexpected nonlinear t r ans f~rmat ion .~  
Thus the evolutionist theory with its new findings on the role of pluralistic development, 
"organizing chance" (according to I. Prigogine), complementarity and synergy provides recourse 
for studies in cooperative business and economic options. 
3 Cooperative Business Strategies 
Over the last fifteen to  twenty years, the production systems have undergone substantial changes. 
It is in this framework that  cooperative business grew to  an international issue and became 
subject to  a variety of theoretical studies. 
A hypothesis was developed that  cooperative behavior was not marginal, but essential, not 
meliorating, but crucial to industrial and business performance. Unlike in the traditional eco- 
nomic theory, which holds that  productivity and profitability are a function of the intensity of the 
competition, it is argued that  competition and cooperation are not only mutually contradicting 
and opposing, but a t  the same time complementary and promoting. 
In the beginning, cooperative business proliferated as a consequence of the stagnation with 
the peak in 1974-1975 in subsequent structural changes. Scores of scholars have described and 
explained the structural transition in terms of altered configuration of firms. Divestments, buy- 
outs, take-overs, acquisitions, mergers and other moves in capital organization stated in evidence 
that  cooperative business schemes were expanding. 
However, the first assumptions that  this was first of all a downstream attempt to save 
the basic value added background were questioned by new theoretical findings. They tried to 
introduce cooperative business as a prospective formulation of the economic growth model. 
'van Foerster, H.: "Bio-Logic* in: Bernard, E.-Kare, N.R.: Biological Prototypes and Synthetic Systems, 
New York, Plenum, 1962, quoted in: Coming, P.A.: The Synergism Hypothesis, Theory of Progressive Evolution, 
New York, McGraw-Hill, 1983, p. 89. 
'When working out his hypothesis of synergism, P.A. Coming has coined the term of "egoistic cooperationn 
thus pointing out to a complex dialectics of both sides, which being in equilibrium may provide a synergetic effect, 
however separated would end in dysynergy. Ibid., p. 239. 
51ndeed, sudden nonlinear transformation must not always carry any "catastrophe." Contrary to it, insight 
may be provided into fragile proportions that might be changed positively with little effort and input. 
4 The Dynamism of International Cooperative Course in Busi- 
ness 
Empirical data  persuade of a gradually, but a t  the same time a steep growing trend of cooperative 
arrangements (see Figure 1). Along with the increase in number, they ramify into various 
mutations and display a very polymorphous pattern.6 
The number of international business agreements increased spectacularly in the first half of 
the 1980s, and the surge continues, so far. 
The world hub of business internationalization is the Triad, in particular the European 
Community. Agreements of the EC soared in the first half of the 1980s with the US almost 
10 times and with Japan 8 times. Meanwhile between USA and Japan they increased 4 times 
(Inside the EC some estimated 20 times). 
In the second half of the 1980s the corresponding figures would be 2.5 times, 2 times and 
2.25 times respectively. 
There are several reasons for such a geographic distribution. The American businesses are 
still mostly individualistic and unshared control is preferred. In Japan, the cooperative relations 
are mostly tied by a distinctive industrial ~ u l t u r e . ~  
The European Community is still facing the process of unification after 1992, so that many 
arrangements are repeated in several member countries blowing thus the number of agreements 
which will be reduced to one in a foreseeable time. 
Among the affluent variety of collaborative arrangements those stressing a closer cooperation, 
a more demanding mutuality and joint creative effort are coming to the fore. Innovative purpose 
more than mere extension seems t o  take the lead. 
This is especially true of the growth of joint ventures. The number of joint business ar- 
rangements indicates a steady growth. In the past, joint capital ventures were judged to be 
a second-best option, when for some reason a direct investment, acquisition or merger was 
restrained. 
Joint ventures in the West are commonplace, however their number is far from an eye-opener. 
According to  statistical da ta  for middle size and large US companies, the number could account 
for some 30,000 (compared with some 12 mil of US business units.)' 
A new field of joint ventures opens in Eastern Europe. After investigative years with mul- 
tiple limitations on the part of East European countries, after 1989, the numbers magnify 
considerablyg (see Figure 2). 
East-West joint ventures should be judged as an evolving phenomenon which may be subject 
t o  further changes. In many cases, the joint venture options seem to be mandated by the fact 
that  in most Eastern countries direct foreign investment has not yet been legally clarified and 
guaranteed to  lure Western capital. The joint venture scheme is then accepted as the second-best 
contingency t o  penetrate the promising Eastern market. Later, the development of joint ventures 
more vigorous than so far will be co-determined by other possibilities of direct investment. 
The Eastern companies prefer joint ventures hoping to make one's way to  convertible cur- 
rency, technological modernization, management skill, and market pull. Because they do not see 
other options, they draw a conclusion of joint venture's not preceded by a build-up of mutuality, 
credibility and trust. 
'Adopted from Herget, M. Morris, D.: Trends in International Collaborative Agreements, in: Contractor, 
F.J.Lorange, F. led./: Cooperative strategies in International Business, Lexington, Lexington-Books, 1988, p. 
101. Estimates by IIASA. 
'Recently, contemplating the control by large companies, and divulging a fear that the pre-war dominance 
might revive, an international article pointed out that "the Japanese sub-contractor isn't in love with his parent 
company. He is just tied to it by tradition and the threat of losing the business." Confronting the Zaibatsu 
Revival, the Daily Yomiuri, Tokio, June 27, 1990 p. 3. 
 ore about that in Cooperative Business Strategies in International Business Promotion, Working Paper, 
IIASA, 1990. 
' ~ d o ~ t e d  from Cooperative Strategies in International Business Promotion, Working Paper, IIASA, 1990. 
Figure 1: Growth of international cooperative business agreements in the 1980s. Source: Coop- 
erative Strategies in Business Promotion, Working Paper, IIASA, 1990. 
Figure 2: East-West Joint Ventures growth in 1988-1990. Source: ECE and IIASA joint ventures 
data base. 
6 
In both cases of West and East, the joint capital venture is frequently not primarily and 
initiatively the best choice of business enhancement, but the next substitute for it. 
5 Structural Conclusions 
Despite innumerable diversity of possibilities, some significant features may be read out of the 
phenomenological interpretation: 
1. Cooperative orientation gained prominence in late 1970s. The theoretical generalization 
followed with a delay of around 10 years, as a t  the early stage the cooperative behavior 
was considered a rebounce of the 1974-1975 recession. 
2. With the years, cooperative behavior gains in creativity, and some arrangements partic- 
ularly in advanced industries, become intriguing, non-transparent and inconceivable. It 
is not easy to trace back all interdependencies, multiple purposes and effects. This is 
true predominantly of high tech industries with an uncomparable demand for research, 
development, experimentation, flexible sub-contract, venture capital, etc. 
3. A conspicuous inclination increases also the cooperative models aiming a t  principal inno- 
vation, product/service differentiation and leading promotion. More than fostering simple 
economy of scale/scope and capital saving mode of production. 
6 Rat ionales for Business Collaborations/ "Critical Mass" 
The cooperative approach is determined either by mere necessity, because otherwise the indi- 
vidual company could not accumulate the capital, physical means and indispensable creative 
potential, or the companies jointly compete for a comparative advantage based on a higher 
economy of scale/scope. 
As a matter of fact, despite different purposes, dichotomy may be reduced to  one rule of 
the "critical mass." The term was derived from theoretical physics, where it describes a state 
of mass, which is the inter-stage between two stages of a material substrate (indifferent and 
compounding, levelled and explosive, solid or disintegrated, etc.) 
Companies operating in subcritical fields will expend labor and capital without accomplishing 
their objectives; all along they will see some prospective possibilities, however will never bring 
their efforts to  an end, or be late and yield to more dynamic competitors. 
The variety of factors and components, the complex character of their issue, makes it almost 
impossible to  derive an exact rule (unless some axiomatic presumptions are adopted). The 
formal methodology could approach a variation of the break-even analysis. The task would 
be to find a point when an innovation could be carried through into the intentional effect in 
size, quality and time. Let us presume that  there is an interdependence between the output 
and input, then a certain order of input would decide the feasibility of the innovation and its 
magnitude. 
In practice, formal methodology might be recommended as a supportive tool. To solve such 
intricate problems is a prerogative of creative enterpreneurs and experts. They use, as a rule, 
a set of comparative analysis, like comparative advantage calculus, comparative input-output 
models, etc. However, if we focus on principal innovations, there would be an  authoritative 
advantage of a scientific breakthrough, technological dominance or exclusive market position, 
etc. Formal methodologies associated with axiomatic assertions only partially provide support 
in decision making. They are not to  be neglected, none the less they can serve as an auxiliary 
argument only. 
In many cases successful breakthrough operations are associated with a decisive commitment 
of creative and tough company leaders. 
For instance, among European car makers some notable cases may be reminded, like Gyl- 
lenhammar a t  Volve, Schmuecker a t  Volkswagen, Agnelli a t  FIAT, Calvet a t  Puegot, Besse a t  
Renault, and others. 
7 Taxonomy of Frequent Business Collaborations 
The taxonomy of cooperative business schemes provides rather extensive options for joint efforts 
and capital ventures. Among various forms of co-operation, those in manufacturing are presumed 
to  be of basic importance. As for the latter, some models might be chosen in order to  highlight 
the co-operative patterns. 
7.1 Cooperative Sub-contracting 
Sub-contracting is a specific model of interfirm relationship in which independent firms establish 
contractual links of demand and supply. 
Sub-contracting may pursue various objectives (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Sub-contracting objectives. 
On the part of the On the part of the 
contractor sub-contractor 
cheap resourcing attainment of scale/scope benefit 
extension of the production stability of deliveries 
capacity distribution network building 
involvement (of the sub-contract) new markets penetration 
into research and development joint venture 
increasing resilience by parallel 
production of parts 
future buy-in 
The other margin is a firm interdependence short of complete integration. 
Through the sub-contract, the supply company becomes a "reduced enterprise" concentrating 
its activities on manufacturing of a limited scope of parts, modules, aggregates. The contracting 
firm may deliver its design and/or manufacturing methods or specifications, undertake assembly, 
packaging, transporting and storing of its sales operation. It may invite the contractor t o  
participate in research, development or experimentation and further improvement of design, 
manufacturing and marketing of the final product.10 
It was a business tradition mainly in the USA to  maintain a number of sub-contractors in 
order to  promote competition among them and select the most appropriate. The links between 
the contractor and sub-contractor were loose through short-term contracts. Exceptions justifying 
endurance in relationship regarded sophisticated products only. 
It has been recognized that  constants cooperation between contractors and sub-contractor 
may involve collaborative combination and synergetic effects in joint marketing, product formu- 
lation, research, design manufacturing, and sales. 
In some industrial countries the old pattern of independence between the final producer and 
sub-contractor are changing. The number of sub-contractors dwindled, the cooperative nature 
deepened. Partners co-ordinate and combine their potential in order to  increase long-term 
innovative and productive outputs. 
The growing size of this organizational and economic change indicates that  probably a com- 
plete re-thinking and re-shaping of business structures are on the way. 
'In particular Japanese supplier-producer relations were stable and participative in product development. 
8 
It seems to  be generally accepted that  the competitiveness of the Japanese automotive 
industry is largely due to  stable cooperative arrangements between final producers and sub- 
contractors. Other world car makers try to  imitate the Japanese interfirm relations, however 
not without difficulties. This a t  the same time indicates that  there is a major economical and 
organizational change in economic structures and organization development. 
In most countries enduring contractor and sub-contractor relations are more common in 
the defense industry. This is a kind of industry where the pattern of the whole socioeconomic 
relations seems to be the closest to  the Japanese socioeconomic setting. There is a sponsorship 
and coordinating role of the state, tough quality management, long-term employment, incentives 
for reliable more than high performance, etc. 
For East European countries, the  sub-contract may open a path to  the world market. Many 
firms started their market success by modestly supplying specialized parts. They a t  the same 
time used some advanced firms as a hauling engine to  world markets. They gradually built their 
distribution networks and used the to  get autonomous buyers and sellers. 
This could be a feasible strategy, under the imperative condition that  the sub-contracting 
firms are able to  develop high quality products. On an international competitive level (as quality, 
cost and supply flexibility and post-sales servicing regards)." 
7.2 Cooperative Business in Clusters and Networks 
Small and middle size companies are credited for many advancements in industry. After the 
recession and stagnation in the 1970s, they fared better than large ones. 
In many segments of the markets, the small and medium companies are exposed to  the com- 
petetive thrust of large multinational corporations (MNC). After the large oligopolies have gone 
through a process of adjustment, they experience an above-average performance. As a rule, they 
are still more capable in organizing the division of task, responsibilities and production, attain- 
ing a threshold "critical mass" of capital, research and development, manufacturing capacities, 
marketing, and make use of the benefits of the economy of scale/scope. 
The avowed ability of small and medium firms to  cope with the volatile market and the 
power of large oligopolistic firms are cause for another cooperative scheme. It is a collaboration 
between the small and large a t  the stage of innovative product development. Large firms may 
provide various lines of guidance in: 
research, development or experimentation and testing capacities, 
sophisticated equipment, tool and material, 
instruction, training or skilled personnel, 
marketing, 
financial funding, 
legal (patent or copyrights) protection, 
resourcing and logistics, 
informatics, 
administration, etc. 
Several models of cooperation are apparent in present production systems. Without rounding 
the taxonomy out, the following ones may provide a common pattern: 
"T. Bata, the Czech tycoon in shoe manufacturing, used to quote the American thinker R.W. Emerson: make 
the best mouse-traps, and the world will find the way to your door. 
r cooperation between one or several large firms with one or several small firms on a short- 
term contractual basis; 
r cooperation between one or several sponsoring firms with a network or a cluster of small 
firms; 
joint research, engineering, manufacturing, training or marketing projects; 
r founding of small firms by larger ones. 
While the first option is a standard one, it does not need any further explanation. Unlike 
that, other options reach beyond a simple buyer-seller relation and involve cooperative action. 
Sponsoring large companies are sometimes organizing a network or a cluster of semidependent 
(or fully dependent) small firms, by which the large firms benefit from lower cost development, 
experiment or trials, low cost supply of parts, modules or aggregates, delegating risk of innova- 
tions and start-up production, providing various technical, productive administrative assistance 
and capital subsidies, etc. 
In the last years, this kind of cooperative approach seems to  be growing in acceptance and 
applications in Western countries among a variety of dynamic economic and organizational 
forms. 
For instance, one of the leading French firms, Compagnie Saint Gobain established an af- 
filiation Saint Gobain Development, in order to intermediate cooperation with more than one 
hundred small firms. Many large Western companies found it beneficial to forsake the old 
buyer-seller relation and build up some more expedient cooperative links. 
There are several models of sponsoring large companies surrounded by small firms. In gen- 
eral, they may be attributed to  one of two margins: 
Clusters of small companies based on habitual sub-contract model converted into stable 
cooperative arrangement between the sponsoring company and any of the small firms 
separately, thus being coordinated by the centripetal relation to  the contracting company 
only; 
this "satelite organization" is expanding and might serve as a testimony of substantial 
changes of industrial organization. It is especially promising in association with informat- 
ics (and telecommunication) and logistics LLjust-in-time" in the USA, or the "kanban" 
(label) in Japan supply system). 
More or less explicitly organized network of small companies with complex vertical ( to  the 
sponsoring company) and horizontal (among small firms) interdependence. 
As a general trend, models of organized relations (approaching a quasi-integration under the 
sponsoring firm's leadership) expand. That propensity to  cooperate on an organized basis might 
mark a new industrial division of work and production system coming of age. 
7.3 New Firms Founding 
Cooperative approach is also dominant in arrangements that lead to establishment of new small 
firms by a sponsoring large company. The rationale for setting up of dependent or semidependent 
firms might be 
r simple extension of the production capacity or mark coverage by starting autonomous 
manufacturing a t  a critical scale/scope in order to  attain benefit of lower cost (first of all 
overhead cost); 
r placing affiliations as close to  the specific market as possible, in particular in distant regions 
or foreign countries; 
placing small firms outside of the logic, organizational structure and administrative be- 
havior of the parent company, in order to  facilitate new product/service development or a 
kind of high risk venture business. 
The latter model might be nearby another option of intrapreneurship when autonomous units 
are set up inside a large firm however exempted from the rigidities of the core of the company 
(without dismantling its integration into the company's economic fabric). 
7.4 Cooperation on Joint Projects 
Another option, less usual, however also growing in popularity, is the cooperation between 
large and small firms on joint projects. There might be several rationale for such cooperative 
arrangements, for instance 
the complexity of the project naturally requires participation of prospective suppliers; 
the large firm invites one or more small firms to get involved in order t o  make use of their 
specialized research, engineering, production or marketing facilities and know-how; 
the task involves many parallel or mutually excluding experiments, trials, tests, etc. 
the small company asks for participation in order to  get in timely contact with innovation 
which might shape its future development or participate in subsidies or other benefits 
associated with the project. 
Cooperative efforts are dominant, not the ordinary buyer-seller relation, in such joint pro- 
jects. Simultaneous involvement in joint projects might rather often lead to  a more close com- 
mitment of shared goals in the future. 
Launched in 1985, the Eureka R&D cooperative program, was able to  put together many 
large and small firms of demanding tasks. Small firms, members of Eureka projects, are explicitly 
invited to  participate on tasks that are hallmarks of professionalism. 
7.5 Interfirm Research and Technology Cooperation 
Among the variety of cooperative business schemes one merits specific attention. R&D (R&E) 
investments and operating costs are felt not to  be reliably rewarding. That perception stems from 
the experience that  future prospects of research, development or experimentation results, are 
often dimmed by uncertainties about the quality and cost of the results obtained, expenditures 
to  be brought about, economies of scale/scope to be attained, timing of the market entry, 
competitors' behavior, etc. 
Many research projects have been developed on a collaborative basis. For example the all- 
European Eureka program has surged to  a highly collaborative network of interfirm relations. 
Eureka declared as a prerequisite to  accept only projects with prospects for world wide com- 
petitive edge. Of over 200 projects involving some 1,200 companies since 1988, around 20% 
have been small and medium-sized companies, 40% large ones and the remaining 40% have 
been made up of universities, research institutes and other organizations. After one year, the 
number of projects had grown t o  around 400 and the participation of small and large business 
and non-business organizations has retained almost the same proportions.12 
A similar albeit not an identical cooperative model, is an arrangement on technological 
transferring. The nature of collaborative efforts is distinctively different. Under the R&D (R& 
E, for experimentation) agreements, partners are not sure of the expected results. The gradually 
accumulated knowledge and experience might be promising, while no guarantee of the success 
can be taken for granted. Under interfirm arrangements on technology transfer, the partners 
share results which already exist. 
12~ureka,  Together to the Future, Project Progress Report, Brussels, 1989, 1990. 
This is to  explain the rapidly growing amount of technology transfer agreements in the 
West.13 Not that  much in the East-West relations. Some impediments are depressing the 
technology transport potential. Among them most concurrent are 
r incertitude of Western investors about the stability of the political, legal, and economic 
setting; 
r lack of knowledge and training on the part of both partners;14 
r not satisfactory infrastructure in Eastern Europe (consulting, auditing, banking, available 
facilities, resourcing, informatics and communication, etc); 
no strict codes of conduct as intellectual property (such as patents, copyrights) is con- 
cerned; 
international restrictions assuring the protection of national security (prohibition imposed 
on high and other sensitive technology transfer), etc. 
8 High Technology's Impact on Cooperative Behavior 
In early 1980s the "high technologies" emerged. They are mostly recognized by their sophisti- 
cation conveyed by the clearness as a relative share of the R&D (R&E) costs, of scientist and 
engineers employed. They are also earmarked by their rapid growth. 
J.A. Schumpeter raised already in the 1920s the idea of "creative destruction," a continuous 
improvement of all factors and components of prosperity. "The competition which really counts 
is competition of new goods, new methods, new supply and resourcing, new types of organiza- 
tion ... in other words, competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage."15 The 
human ecological potential of high technologies, their appeal t o  knowledge, education, culture, 
their capacity to  reduce the consumption of natural resources including their recycling are not 
always divulged. High technologies hardly anywhere exceed some 5% of the whole technology, 
however their dynamism predicts their great future.16. 
The areas of high technology become in particular interdependent and cross-fertilization 
creates new generations of technologies which are extensive and complex. High technologies are 
especially apt  for cooperative business endeavor. 
9 Global Dimensions for Cooperative Business 
The globalization of products/services and markets induces many companies to  adopt a global 
strategy. The reasons for a far-sighted and global approach to  company prosperity became an 
indispensable prerequisite of survival for a number of industries. 
Several arguments are being brought forth in order t o  demarcate the threshold of globaliza- 
tion: 
13See Liebrenz, M.L.: Transfer of Technology, US Multinationals and Eastern Europe, New York, Praeger 1982. 
While reliable in the broad sense, the generalization reposes on fragmented da ta  only. See also Jirasek, J.-Becker, 
R.: Technology Transfer, Basic Knowledge and Reflections, Laxenburg, IIASA, 1990. and Jirasek, J.: East-West 
Cooperative Strategies in Business Promotion, Laxenburg, IIASA, 1990. 
"Several partial studies in the West and in the East converge in these conclusions. For instance, a review of a 
study undertaken by Merton Associates among British managers with a conclusion that "British companies lack 
the skills and foresight to  succeed. Of the 200 managers who work in Eastern Europe, 66% d o  not know enough 
and 82% show insufficient initiative." Financial times, February 13, 1990, p.11. 
15Schumpeter, J.A.: The  Theory of economic development, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press 1949, 
introduction. 
''A recent book on high technology delineates "six high technology sectors": 1. pharmaceuticals 2. office 
and EDP equipment 3. telecommunication 4. electronics 5. Biotechnology, 6. New materials, High Technology 
Europe, Brussels, EC, Blackwell (Oxford), 1990, p. 10. 
r industries with extreme requirements for research, development (experimentation) and 
other sophistication entangling some capital expenditures that may be amortized only on 
a world basis17 
r consumer goods industries with large capital investments can only harvest their oligopolis- 
tic profits when they market their products instantly on the global basis (if there are any 
delays the company may be defeated by another competitor who was faster.)'' 
In the face of growing globalization, enterprises have t o  provide themselves with specific in- 
ternational advantages such as size, intercountry cooperation, build-up of world-scale resources, 
etc.lg 
M. Porter generalized his studies (1970s) of regained competitive strategy (after a temporal 
decline) as options of three advantages: 
1. cost control by technical and organizational advance (automation, robotics, CAD/CAM, 
etc.), 
2. fast product improvement by applying technical breakthroughs, focused on sharply differ- 
entiated models, 
3. the niche strategy.20. 
10 Comments on the volatile character of collaborative rela- 
t ions 
Business cooperative schemes may take many different patterns. They range from pre-competi- 
tive collective actions which later turn to  a background for competitive behavior (like agreements 
on exchange of information, pre-market harmonization of goods/services, joint research, etc.) to  
a complete substitute for market rivalry and conflict. From tacit cooperation (collusion) over a 
number of forms when the partners preserve their independence to  others when they renounce 
their sovereignty. 
Within these formulas partners seek to  combine their capital, physical and intellectual assets 
in order to  enhance their market position and increase their profits. Within these formulas 
they prolong their competition and try to  modify their course of action and gain individual 
advantages. Cooperative business conduct is by far not always easy. 
The experience of cooperative business provides many examples that  partners failed to  de- 
velop a cooperative code of conduct to  achieve their objectives. Quantified in figures, up to  30% 
did not start operations, and another 30% failed t o  achieve their objectives in the first 3 years. 
Indeed, there are many divergencies in both directions from an empirical a ~ e r a g e . ~ '  
11 What Does Cooperative Business Behavior Mean For East- 
ern Europe 
There are a number of routes for East-West developments. One or two are almost excluded: 
an independent growth or a similar way based on East European countries mutual assistance. 
Both have been tried in the past to  internationally integrate Eastern Europe. 
"To exemplify, it is usually marked the 1 billion US $ limit, which applies to such development costs like a new 
telecommunication exchange and satelite network, a new large passenger aircraft, aerospace deployment, high 
speed trains, large raw fuel and material developments, etc. 
18Examples: Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicle breakthroughs, new computer and optical device 
generations, etc. 
lSWoote, P.de(ed.): High Technology Europe, Oxford, Blackwell 1990, p.12. 
"Porter, M.: The Competitive Strategy, New York, Free press, 1980 
2 1 Sources for such a generalization: Walmsley, J.: Handbook of International Joint Ventures, London, Graham 
& Trotman 1982. East-West Joint Venture News, Geneva 1989-1990, IIASA Joint Venture Data Base 1989-1990. 
Another option may be direct foreign investment. Large companies having sufficient strength 
and control of market segments often prefer it that  way. This involves either founding of foreign 
subsidiaries, or acquisitions of existing foreign enterprises. 
The direct foreign investment strategy proved sufficiently beneficial the last time. In the 
1980s, the number of takeovers in the USA increased by a factor of approximately 3, in Europe 
around 2,5 and in Japan some 6 respectively. 
Most Eastern European countries are about to  privatize their company ownership, it is 
presumed that  direct foreign investment may find remarkable opportunities there. Some bids 
have already been extended to  Eastern partners. 
Political powers in some Eastern European countries are still reluctant to  open an unre- 
stricted capital market because they question the risk of being "bought out" by strong and 
aggressive competitors. The host countries may soon run into difficulties arising from a subor- 
dinated position of their companies. 
12 East-West Cooperative Options 
The cooperative behavior of Western and Eastern companies brings toget her partners with 
different initial "assets" and diverging interests. In consideration of such a basic dichotomy, the 
build-up of mutuality has t o  overcome several obstacles. 
Table 3: "Assets" and purposes of Western and Eastern companies. 
Western companies Eastern companies 
Assets 
Technology and know-how Production capacities 
Convertible monetary capital Sub-contract 
Marketing skills Intellectual labor 
Purposes 
Market bridgehead Convertible monetary capital formation 
Profit extension technical modernization 
Cheap resourcing Management skills 
Low cost labor Market pull 
The casual analysis of interdependence of "assets" and purposes discloses that  despite dif- 
ferent and partly opposing interests, there are several contingencies fostering complementarity 
and conjunction. 
The East European market is so far the largest market reserve of the global market growth, 
it provides access to  some 400 mil inhabitants, 15% of the world's agricultural area, 11% of the 
coal and 20% of the crude oil world output, 30% of the world iron and steel production, 11% of 
the world merchant fleet, 30% of world R&D workers, etc. 
The best to  combine Western technology and the know how with could be Eastern production 
capacities. Along with this expansion of production remarkable increases could be achieved in 
the economy of scale/scope. Both partners can earn from the beginning and develop a standing 
partnership in the long run. 
Many Eastern manufacturing companies can supply specialized parts or modules complying 
with world standards and market needs. They may disclose a market niche and challenge other 
competitors. In the case of business partnerships, deliveries of parts/modules, the final cost of 
Western products may decrease and a t  the same time be instrumental in providing a full loading 
of Eastern production capacities. 
There are rather often cases where Eastern European products do not yield any sizable 
profits because they are lacking marketing services. Insufficient marketing skills and activities 
are also a rather frequent cause of a low lucrativity. 
Low-cost labor in Eastern countries does not attract as much interest as would be normally 
expected. In up-to-date manufacturing the share of wages have been mostly reduced to around 
10% of total costs. Other cost items regained importance. 
Eastern labor is said to be generally well-educated, a bit less vocationally trained. However, 
workers lack performative effort and discipline. Neither do they observe strict rules nor work 
economy. 
Low cost labor is nowadays widely available. The East does not offer any exclusive advantages 
except, thanks to a comparatively high cultural and elevated level of adaptability for more 
sophisticated jobs and professional flexibility. 
Compared to  normal workers, the engineers and other intellectuals proved to be not only 
less expensive, but a t  the same time rather advanced in their professional skills, in particular in 
complex engineering tasks, software developments, research and experimentations. 
Compared with the labor remuneration in the West, the workers in Eastern companies get 
from 20% to 40% and the intellectuals from 10% to 30% of their Western ~ o u n t e r p a r t s . ~ ~  
Engineers and also production managers are as a rule praised for their educational back- 
ground (except that they do not have advanced skills in the work with CAD/CAM, technological 
electronics, computer control), but criticized for their reluctance to take responsibility and make 
economically argued decisions. 
There are complaints from Eastern partners as well. Western partners, they say, are looking 
for one-sided gains, which implicate dependence and submission, shift the risk on the other side, 
in other words are not frankly and correctly cooperative. 
In some rather rare cases, Western and Eastern researchers were joined and succeeded in 
developing original breakthroughs (cases are available in electronics, chemical synthesis, biotech- 
nology, new  material^).^^ 
Another complaint relates to  the propensity of many large Western companies to convert 
Eastern plants in their "extended bench", without research and development, engineering ser- 
vices, executing production tasks according to supplied design and methods. 
22~ccording to the present exchange rate; not according to the consumption basket prices. 
23see Working Paper 'Technology Transfer" Basic Knowledge and Reflections, in particular the appended case 
studies, IIASA, 1990. 
